asn.dev

Routing security

AS35834 CCP CCP ehf. Autonomous System

Hosting RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 9 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 9 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS35834 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
87.237.32.0/23RPKI validIRR52
87.237.32.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
87.237.33.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
87.237.34.0/23RPKI validIRR51
87.237.34.0/24RPKI validIRR57
87.237.36.0/24RPKI validIRR51
87.237.38.0/23RPKI validIRR52
87.237.38.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
87.237.39.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

9 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS35834 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
87.237.32.0/23/23RIPENCC
87.237.32.0/24/24RIPENCC
87.237.33.0/24/24RIPENCC
87.237.34.0/23/23RIPENCC
87.237.34.0/24/24RIPENCC
87.237.36.0/24/24RIPENCC
87.237.38.0/23/23RIPENCC
87.237.38.0/24/24RIPENCC
87.237.39.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS35834 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
87.237.32.0/23RIPECCP ISCCP-MNT2016-09-29Announced
87.237.34.0/23RIPECCP UK-PROCCP-MNT2016-09-29Announced
87.237.34.0/24RIPECCP UK-PROCCP-MNT2021-10-29Announced
87.237.36.0/24RIPECCP UK-INFCCP-MNT2016-09-29Announced
87.237.38.0/23RIPECCP ISCCP-MNT2016-09-29Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS35834 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CCPRIPELists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS75RADBLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-GLOBEINTERNET-CLIENTSARINLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-GLOBEINTERNET-CLIENTSRIPELists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-GTTCUSTRIPELists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-ITXBR1RADBLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-JARMTELCOALTDBLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-KPNRIPELists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-MZIMA-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-SIPRIPELists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-TELECITYGROUP-UKRIPELists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS-XO-BARINLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS13335:AS-CUSTOMERSARINLists AS35834 as a direct member
AS51202:AS-ALLALTDBLists AS35834 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.