Autonomous system
AS35768 MSLINK-AS Sergey Cherentayev
Unclassified RIPE Route Server
Summary
MSLINK
business russia small
MSLINK-AS is operated by Sergey Cherentayev.
What it's used for
- The address space carries no distinct reverse-DNS identifiers, with netnames
RU-SERGEY2-20051021andRU-SERGEY2-20110617indicating personal or small-scale allocation. - The AS announces 4096 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes and maintains 15 observed neighbours, a ratio suggesting a small-scale business or individual network rather than a large transit or access provider.
Notable
- Registrants for both prefixes list
ilyaandSergey Cherentayev, aligning directly with the AS holder. - The address inventory consists of two /21 blocks,
87.237.40.0/21and176.74.200.0/21, representing a modest and static allocation.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| MSK-IX Moscow | Moscow, Russia | 195.208.208.206 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-03, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 4.10K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS35768- Registry name
- MSLINK-AS
- Registrant
- lir-ru-sergey2-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- kod@mslink.ru
- Registered
- 2005-10-21
- Last changed
- 2025-05-05
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- Iris-tel ltd
- Network type
- Route Server
- Scope
- Europe
- Traffic ratio
- Balanced
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
AS-MSLINK-MNT- Website
- http://iris-tel.ru
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS35768
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS35768
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,851 prefixes, as published 2026-11-04. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere