asn.dev

Routing security

AS35518 SASAG

Residential RIPE Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS35518 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:d80::/29RPKI validIRR35
46.245.184.0/21RPKI validIRR54
87.245.64.0/18RPKI validIRR54
88.151.144.0/21RPKI validIRR54
88.213.128.0/18RPKI validIRR54
91.102.192.0/21RPKI validIRR54
185.43.200.0/22RPKI validIRR54
193.134.4.0/22RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS35518 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
46.245.184.0/21/21RIPENCC
87.245.64.0/18/18RIPENCC
88.151.144.0/21/21RIPENCC
88.213.128.0/18/18RIPENCC
91.102.192.0/21/21RIPENCC
185.43.200.0/22/22RIPENCC
193.134.4.0/22/22RIPENCC
2a00:d80::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS35518 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2001:67c:2230::/48RIPEIMV Informatik GmbHMNT-SASAG2017-11-02Not announced
46.245.184.0/21RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2011-02-04Announced
87.245.64.0/18RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2005-10-04Announced
88.151.144.0/21RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2010-03-01Announced
88.213.128.0/18RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2016-11-04Announced
91.102.192.0/21RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2012-08-30Announced
185.43.200.0/22RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2015-01-23Announced
193.134.4.0/22RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2018-10-19Announced
2a00:d80::/29RIPEsasag Kabelkommunikation AGMNT-SASAG2018-10-05Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS35518 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-SHINTERNETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-CABLECOMRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS-GLOBALRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS35518 as a direct member
AS-LIECOMTEL-PEERSRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS-SHINTERNETRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS-TELECOM-PEERSRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS13030:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS25091:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS42476:AS-SWISSIX-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member
AS8508:AS-SASK-UPC-INRIPELists AS35518 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-31 20:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-31. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.