asn.dev

Routing security

AS34393 SYSTEL-AS

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS34393 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0e:c980::/32RPKI validIRR30
91.192.56.0/22RPKI validIRR54
91.218.241.0/24RPKI validIRR54
95.215.20.0/22RPKI validIRR54
95.215.24.0/21RPKI validIRR54
195.177.64.0/22RPKI validIRR54
195.177.84.0/22RPKI validIRR54
2001:67c:2f64::/48RPKI validIRR30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS34393 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
91.192.56.0/22/22RIPENCC
91.218.241.0/24/24RIPENCC
95.215.20.0/22/22RIPENCC
95.215.24.0/21/21RIPENCC
195.177.64.0/22/22RIPENCC
195.177.84.0/22/22RIPENCC
2001:67c:2f64::/48/48RIPENCC
2a0e:c980::/29/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS34393 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
193.28.226.0/24RIPESystel Systemy TeleinformatyczneMNT-PL-ADAMJANKOWSKI-12020-09-10Not announced
2a10:f781:10:f277::/64RIPEEPIX-LORA-SYSTELSYTEPOLUDNIE-MNT2022-05-16Not announced
91.192.56.0/22RIPE—SST-PL-MNT2024-10-01Announced
91.218.241.0/24RIPE—MNT-PL-ADAMJANKOWSKI-12024-09-13Announced
95.215.20.0/22RIPESystel Systemy TeleinformatyczneSST-PL-MNT2016-01-30Announced
95.215.24.0/21RIPESystel Systemy TeleinformatyczneSST-PL-MNT2016-01-30Announced
195.177.64.0/22RIPESystel Systemy TeleinformatyczneSST-PL-MNT2016-02-01Announced
195.177.84.0/22RIPESystel Systemy TeleinformatyczneSST-PL-MNT2016-02-01Announced
2001:67c:2f64::/48RIPE—SST-PL-MNT2019-03-17Announced
2a0e:c980::/32RIPE—SST-PL-MNT2019-06-06Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS34393 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-IPARTNERSRIPELists AS34393 as a direct member
AS-NETIARIPELists AS34393 as a direct member
AS-NETIA-MSK-IXRIPELists AS34393 as a direct member
AS-NETIA-PEERINGRIPELists AS34393 as a direct member
AS-SYSTELRIPELists AS34393 as a direct member
AS-TKPSARIPELists AS34393 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-PLRIPELists AS34393 as a direct member
AS8246:AS-TPNETRIPELists AS34393 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.