asn.dev

Routing security

AS33764 AFRINIC-ZA-JNB-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS33764 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
196.2.3.0/24RPKI validIRR52
196.192.114.0/23RPKI validIRR52
196.192.141.0/24RPKI validIRR53
196.216.2.0/23RPKI validIRR52
2001:42d0::/48RPKI validIRR34
2001:42d0:1::/48RPKI validIRR34
2001:42d0:2::/48RPKI validIRR34
2001:43f8:d00::/48RPKI validIRR34

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS33764 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
196.2.3.0/24/24AFRINIC
196.192.114.0/23/24AFRINIC
196.192.141.0/24/24AFRINIC
196.216.2.0/23/24AFRINIC
2001:42d0::/48/48AFRINIC
2001:42d0:1::/48/48AFRINIC
2001:42d0:2::/48/48AFRINIC
2001:43f8:d00::/48/48AFRINIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS33764 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
196.2.3.0/24AFRINICAFRINIC-JNB-PREFIXAFRINIC-IT-MNT2015-11-20Announced
196.192.114.0/23AFRINICAFRINIC-ZA-JNB-AS2AFRINIC-IT-MNT2019-11-27Announced
196.192.141.0/24AFRINICAFRINIC-ZA-TrainingLabAFRINIC-IT-MNT2026-07-30Announced
196.216.2.0/23AFRINICAFRINIC-ZA-JNB-ASAFRINIC-IT-MNT2014-09-16Announced
2001:42d0::/48AFRINICAFRINIC-ISO_OPERATIONS_1AFRINIC-IT-MNT2022-09-28Announced
2001:42d0:1::/48AFRINICAFRINIC-ISO_OPERATIONS_2AFRINIC-IT-MNT2022-09-28Announced
2001:42d0:2::/48AFRINICAFRINIC-PKL_OPERATIONSAFRINIC-IT-MNT2022-09-13Announced
2001:43f8:d00::/48AFRINICAFRINIC Hosting - JNBAFRINIC-IT-MNT2018-08-31Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS33764 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-30844-LIQUID-CUST-EXTAFRINICLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-30844-LIQUID-EXTAFRINICLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-AFRINICAFRINICLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-DIGINETITCC-PEERSRIPELists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-IS-INTRADBLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-ISZARADBLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-LIQUID-EXTRIPELists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-LIQUID-JINXPEERSRIPELists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-VERIZON-V6RIPELists AS33764 as a direct member
AS-WA-PEERSRIPELists AS33764 as a direct member
AS37271:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS37271:AS-PEERSRADBLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS3741:AS-IS-INTNTTCOMLists AS33764 as a direct member
AS3741:AS-ISZANTTCOMLists AS33764 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.