asn.dev

Routing security

AS328661 C-Way-Computers

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 100% 13 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 5 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS328661 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2c0f:e898::/32RPKI validIRR18
102.215.72.0/22RPKI validIRR52
102.218.184.0/22RPKI validIRR52
102.218.184.0/23RPKI validIRR14
102.218.184.0/24RPKI validIRR52
102.218.186.0/23RPKI validIRR14
102.218.228.0/22RPKI validIRR52
102.218.228.0/23RPKI validIRR covering14
102.218.230.0/23RPKI validIRR covering14
102.218.231.0/24RPKI validIRR52
102.222.236.0/23RPKI validIRR52
102.222.236.0/24RPKI validIRR covering14
102.222.237.0/24RPKI validIRR covering14

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

5 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS328661 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
102.215.72.0/22/24AFRINIC
102.218.184.0/22/24AFRINIC
102.218.228.0/22/24AFRINIC
102.222.236.0/23/24AFRINIC
2c0f:e898::/32/64AFRINIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS328661 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
102.215.72.0/22AFRINICC-Way BroadbandCCC2-MNT2022-06-10Announced
102.218.184.0/22AFRINICC-Way BroadbandCCC2-MNT2021-08-20Announced
102.218.184.0/22RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS34912025-03-28Announced
102.218.184.0/23AFRINICC-Way NetworkCCC2-MNT2021-11-02Announced
102.218.184.0/24AFRINICC-Way KZNCCC2-MNT2021-11-02Announced
102.218.186.0/23AFRINICC-Way NetworkCCC2-MNT2021-11-02Announced
102.218.228.0/22AFRINICC-Way BroadbandCCC2-MNT2021-11-24Announced
102.218.231.0/24AFRINICC-Way CPTCCC2-MNT2022-06-07Announced
102.222.236.0/23AFRINICC-Way BroadbandCCC2-MNT2020-07-01Announced
2c0f:e898::/32AFRINICC-WayCCC2-MNT2024-10-18Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS328661 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-LIQUID-EXTRIPELists AS328661 as a direct member
AS-NETWORKPLATFORMSRADBLists AS328661 as a direct member
AS-NETWORKPLATFORMSRIPELists AS328661 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.