asn.dev

Routing security

AS328315 Crisp-Fibre

Residential AFRINIC

RPKI valid 100% 23 of 23 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

23 observed

Every prefix observed with AS328315 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2c0f:eec8::/32RPKI validIRR31
2c0f:eec8::/35RPKI validIRR31
2c0f:eec8:2000::/35RPKI validIRR31
2c0f:eec8:4000::/35RPKI validIRR31
2c0f:eec8:6000::/35RPKI validIRR31
2c0f:eec8:8000::/35RPKI validIRR31
2c0f:eec8:a000::/35RPKI validIRR31
2c0f:eec8:c000::/35RPKI validIRR covering1
102.164.80.0/20RPKI validIRR50
102.164.80.0/24RPKI validIRR52
102.164.81.0/24RPKI validIRR52
102.164.82.0/23RPKI validIRR51
102.164.82.0/24RPKI validIRR51
102.164.83.0/24RPKI validIRR51
102.164.84.0/24RPKI validIRR52
102.164.85.0/24RPKI validIRR52
102.164.86.0/23RPKI validIRR52
102.164.88.0/22RPKI validIRR52
102.164.92.0/24RPKI validIRR52
102.164.93.0/24RPKI validIRR51
102.164.94.0/23RPKI validIRR covering1
102.164.94.0/24RPKI validIRR53
102.164.95.0/24RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS328315 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
102.164.80.0/20/24AFRINIC
2c0f:eec8::/32/35AFRINIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

21 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS328315 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
102.164.80.0/20AFRINICCrisp FibreCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.80.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - Core JHBCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.81.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - JHBCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.82.0/23AFRINICCrisp Fibre - CPTCFL1-MNT2025-02-10Announced
102.164.82.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - CPTCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.83.0/24AFRINICTeraco CPTCFL1-MNT2020-12-15Announced
102.164.84.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - JHB FTTHCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.85.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - JHBCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.86.0/23AFRINICCrisp FIbre - NWETCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.88.0/22AFRINICCrisp Fibre - JHB FTTHCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.92.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - JHB APNCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
102.164.93.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - CPTCFL1-MNT2024-02-15Announced
102.164.94.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - KZNCFL1-MNT2023-08-07Announced
102.164.95.0/24AFRINICCrisp Fibre - KZNCFL1-MNT2023-08-07Announced
2c0f:eec8::/32AFRINICCrisp CoreCFL1-MNT2020-12-15Announced
2c0f:eec8::/35AFRINICCrisp Fibre - Core JHBCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
2c0f:eec8:2000::/35AFRINICCrisp Fibre - Customer JHBCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
2c0f:eec8:4000::/35AFRINICCrisp Fibre - Core CPTCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
2c0f:eec8:6000::/35AFRINICCrisp Fibre - Customer CPTCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
2c0f:eec8:8000::/35AFRINICCrisp Fibre - Core KZNCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced
2c0f:eec8:a000::/35AFRINICCrisp Fibre - Customer KZNCFL1-MNT2022-12-12Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS328315 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CRISPFIBREAFRINICLists AS328315 as a direct member
AS-LIQUID-EXTRIPELists AS328315 as a direct member
AS327794:AS-CLIENTSAFRINICLists AS328315 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-11 12:23 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-11. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.