asn.dev

Routing security

AS327724 NITA

Unclassified APNIC Enterprise

RPKI valid 92% 11 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 1 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 92% 0 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 5 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS327724 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2001:43f8:1370::/48No ROAIRR other origin30
2c0f:f750::/32RPKI validIRR30
102.209.200.0/22RPKI validIRR52
154.72.192.0/19RPKI validIRR57
154.72.195.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
154.72.197.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
154.72.202.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
154.72.208.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
154.72.209.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
154.72.210.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
154.72.211.0/24RPKI validIRR covering51
154.72.214.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

5 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS327724 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
102.209.200.0/22/24AFRINIC
154.72.192.0/19/24AFRINIC
2001:43f8:1a20::/48/48AFRINIC
2001:43f8:1a21::/48/48AFRINIC
2c0f:f750::/32/48AFRINIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

3 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS327724 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
102.209.200.0/22AFRINICNITA-UNITA-UG-MNT2024-02-29Announced
154.72.192.0/19AFRINICNational Information Technology Authority UgandaNITA-UG-MNT2016-11-22Announced
2c0f:f750::/32AFRINICNational Information Technology Authority UgandaNITA-UG-MNT2015-11-17Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS327724 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-327724AFRINICLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-327724RIPELists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-BCS37273RIPELists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-EMIXRADBLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-LIQUIDRIPELists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-MTN-TRANSITRADBLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-MTNNSRADBLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-MTNNS-TRANSITRADBLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-NITAAFRINICLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-SET-SEACOMAFRINICLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-SET-SEACOMRADBLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-SET-SEACOMRIPELists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-SNET-KEAFRINICLists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-SNET-KERIPELists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS327724 as a direct member
AS-UDOSRADBLists AS327724 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-24 12:14 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-24. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.