asn.dev

Routing security

AS3253 SOVINTEL-EF-AS Uralrelcom Net

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 20 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 60% 7 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS3253 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
95.26.38.0/23No ROANo IRR52
95.26.40.0/23No ROANo IRR52
95.26.42.0/23No ROANo IRR52
95.26.64.0/23No ROANo IRR52
95.26.66.0/23No ROANo IRR52
95.26.68.0/23No ROANo IRR52
95.30.91.0/24No ROANo IRR52
195.12.64.0/19No ROAIRR other origin52
194.226.144.0/20No ROAIRR52
194.226.146.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
194.226.154.0/23No ROAIRR covering52
195.58.0.0/19No ROAIRR52
195.58.0.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
212.23.64.0/19No ROAIRR52
212.119.242.0/23No ROAIRR52
213.140.96.0/19No ROAIRR52
213.191.26.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
213.242.192.0/18No ROAIRR52
213.242.203.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
217.114.238.0/23No ROAIRR covering52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS3253 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 6 not announced

Route objects naming AS3253 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
128.72.0.0/21RIPERU-CORBINA BROADBAND BLOCK URALRU-CORBINA-MNT2019-02-12Not announced
128.75.64.0/19RIPERU-BEELINE-BROADBAND-EKATERINBURGRU-CORBINA-MNT2019-09-25Not announced
128.75.96.0/22RIPERU-BEELINE-BROADBAND-EKATERINBURGRU-CORBINA-MNT2019-09-25Not announced
188.122.160.0/19RIPE"Golden ISP" Ltd.AS3253-MNT2009-06-05Not announced
213.191.0.0/19RIPE"Golden ISP" Ltd.RU-CORBINA-MNT2019-04-17Not announced
217.114.224.0/20RIPEFTTB users blockRU-CORBINA-MNT2019-04-17Not announced
194.226.144.0/20RIPEVympelcomROSNIIROS-MNT2012-06-04Announced
195.58.0.0/19RIPEUralRelcom Ltd.AS3253-MNT2014-11-28Announced
212.23.64.0/19RIPEPJSC Vimpelcom (ex UralRelcom Ltd.)AS3253-MNT2018-01-31Announced
212.119.242.0/23RIPELLC "EDN Sovintel" (Ekaterinburg branch)AS3253-MNT2008-03-20Announced
213.140.96.0/19RIPEUralRelcom Ltd.AS3253-MNT2002-06-24Announced
213.242.192.0/18RIPEUralRelcom Ltd.AS3253-MNT2003-06-25Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS3253 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BLOCK-SETRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-BLOCKED-RURIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-BTN-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-EFS-SYNTERRARIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-FORATEC-EKT-IXRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-RITSRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-SOVAM_AKMRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-UNETSRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-URGLDNPEERINGRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-URRTPEERINGRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS-USI-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member
AS31359:AS-PEERINGRIPELists AS3253 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.