asn.dev

Routing security

AS32477 ONLINE-TECH-LLC2

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 59% 13 of 22 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 9 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 59% 8 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

22 observed

Every prefix observed with AS32477 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
208.94.56.0/22No ROAIRR other origin57
208.94.56.0/23No ROANo IRR57
208.94.56.0/24No ROANo IRR57
208.94.57.0/24No ROANo IRR57
208.94.58.0/23No ROANo IRR57
208.94.58.0/24No ROANo IRR57
208.94.59.0/24No ROANo IRR57
2606:5200:8000::/36No ROANo IRR32
2606:5200:8000::/44No ROANo IRR31
64.9.192.0/20RPKI validIRR57
64.9.192.0/21RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.200.0/21RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.204.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.208.0/21RPKI validIRR57
64.9.208.0/22RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.212.0/22RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.216.0/21RPKI validIRR57
64.9.216.0/22RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.217.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.219.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.220.0/22RPKI validIRR covering57
64.9.222.0/24RPKI validIRR covering57

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS32477 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
64.9.192.0/20/24ARIN
64.9.208.0/21/24ARIN
64.9.216.0/21/24ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS32477 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
192.69.75.0/24RADBComcast Cable Communications, Inc.MAINT-AS79222023-11-13Not announced
64.9.192.0/20ARINOtava, LLCMNT-OTL-222026-04-21Announced
64.9.208.0/21ARINOtava, LLCMNT-OTL-222026-04-21Announced
64.9.216.0/21ARINOtava, LLCMNT-OTL-222026-04-21Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS32477 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-63529-AS-IMPORT-AS6939APNICLists AS32477 as a direct member
AS-COMCAST-EDIARADBLists AS32477 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS32477 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS32477 as a direct member
AS-I123-ARINARINLists AS32477 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS32477 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS32477 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.