Autonomous system
AS3176 BDL
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Banque du Liban
government finance legacy
The autonomous system of Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon's central bank, headquartered in Beirut.
What it's used for
- Corporate and operational networking for the central bank itself: internal systems, public-facing services, and connectivity to the Lebanese banking sector it supervises.
- A small allocation by any measure — a few hundred addresses, sized for one institution rather than for selling connectivity onward.
Notable
- Central banks that run their own ASN generally do it for the same reasons: to multi-home across local carriers so payments and settlement infrastructure survives the loss of any single upstream, and to keep their address space independent of an ISP.
- This is a government/central-bank address block, not an eyeball network. Any traffic from it is institutional.
Interesting
- Low four-digit AS numbers like this come from an early RIPE NCC range, issued long before today's five-digit and 32-bit numbers. The number says nothing about the size of the network behind it — this one is tiny.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 768 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| LB | Lebanon | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS3176- Registry name
- BDL
- Registrant
- LB-TERRANET
- Abuse contact
- ripe-admin@terra.net.lb
- Registered
- 2012-04-26
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 3 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS3176
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 3 of 3 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS3176
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere