asn.dev

Routing security

AS3169 BRKNETWORKDEVICES

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 42% 5 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 7 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 5 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS3169 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
156.67.123.0/24No ROAIRR57
185.125.7.0/24No ROAIRR57
185.216.50.0/24No ROAIRR57
185.230.106.0/24No ROAIRR58
185.253.234.0/24No ROAIRR57
193.187.98.0/24No ROAIRR57
195.22.117.0/24No ROAIRR57
37.140.217.0/24RPKI validIRR58
91.238.52.0/22RPKI validIRR58
155.133.62.0/23RPKI validIRR57
176.124.140.0/22RPKI validIRR58
185.60.231.0/24RPKI validIRR57

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

5 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS3169 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
37.140.217.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.238.52.0/22/22RIPENCC
155.133.62.0/23/23RIPENCC
176.124.140.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.60.231.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

14 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS3169 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a02:4a41::/32RIPE—BRKNETWORKDEVICES-MNT2020-02-13Not announced
2a10:f781:10:c1::/64RIPEEPIX-LORA-BRKNETDEVEPOLUDNIE-MNT2022-04-19Not announced
37.140.217.0/24RIPE—PL-MCG-1-MNT2022-01-21Announced
91.238.52.0/22RIPEJacek Pasek BRK Network DevicesBRKNETWORKDEVICES-MNT2012-06-20Announced
155.133.62.0/23RIPEPL-BRK-Network-V4-NNIKNETRONIK-MNT2022-12-29Announced
156.67.123.0/24RIPEPL-BRK-Network-V4NETRONIK-MNT2016-09-01Announced
176.124.140.0/22RIPEJacek Pasek BRK Network DevicesBRKNETWORKDEVICES-MNT2012-09-07Announced
185.60.231.0/24RIPEPL-BRK-Network-V4NETRONIK-MNT2019-04-29Announced
185.125.7.0/24RIPE—PL-ZFIX-1-MNT2021-12-07Announced
185.216.50.0/24RIPE—PL-ZFIX-1-MNT2020-11-25Announced
185.230.106.0/24RIPE—PL-ZFIX-1-MNT2021-03-19Announced
185.253.234.0/24RIPE—PL-ZFIX-1-MNT2022-04-01Announced
193.187.98.0/24RIPE—PL-ZFIX-1-MNT2021-07-19Announced
195.22.117.0/24RIPE—PL-ZFIX-1-MNT2022-08-16Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS3169 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BRKRIPELists AS3169 as a direct member
AS-DIALOGRIPELists AS3169 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS3169 as a direct member
AS-PLIX-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS3169 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS3169 as a direct member
AS-VECTRARIPELists AS3169 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS3169 as a direct member
AS214379:AS-SPNRIPELists AS3169 as a direct member
AS29535:AS-TPIXRIPELists AS3169 as a direct member
AS5617:AS-PLRIPELists AS3169 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.