asn.dev

Routing security

AS30929 GOLEMTECH-AS

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 6 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS30929 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a06:cc0::/29RPKI validIRR34
2a06:cc0::/30RPKI validIRR34
2a06:cc4::/30RPKI validIRR34
185.98.208.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.98.208.0/23RPKI validIRR16
185.98.210.0/23RPKI validIRR16

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS30929 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
185.98.208.0/22/24RIPENCC
2a06:cc0::/29/30RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS6855Slovak Telekom, a.s.Declarednot observed
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclaredObserved
AS48326DataNetworks s.r.o.DeclaredObserved
AS3303Swisscom (Schweiz) AGnot declaredObserved
AS33891Core-Backbone GmbHnot declaredObserved
AS31230Slovak University of Technology in Bratislavanot declaredObserved
AS20562Broadband Hosting B.V.not declaredObserved
AS24482SG.GSnot declaredObserved
AS29504Freenet Liberec, z.s.not declaredObserved
AS37721Virtual Technologies & Solutionsnot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS30929 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.98.208.0/22RIPEGOLEM TECH s.r.o.SK-GOLEM-1-MNT2015-06-18Announced
185.98.208.0/23RIPEGOLEM TECH s.r.o.SK-GOLEM-1-MNT2026-05-07Announced
185.98.210.0/23RIPEGOLEM TECH s.r.o.SK-GOLEM-1-MNT2026-05-07Announced
2a06:cc0::/29RIPE—SK-GOLEM-1-MNT2016-11-18Announced
2a06:cc0::/30RIPEGOLEM TECH s.r.o.SK-GOLEM-1-MNT2026-05-07Announced
2a06:cc4::/30RIPEGOLEM TECH s.r.o.SK-GOLEM-1-MNT2026-05-07Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS30929 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BENESTRARIPELists AS30929 as a direct member
AS-DATANETWORKSRIPELists AS30929 as a direct member
AS-GOLEMTECH-SIXRIPELists AS30929 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS30929 as a direct member
AS-PEERINGCZ-RSRIPELists AS30929 as a direct member
AS-SIXSK-MEMBERSRIPELists AS30929 as a direct member
AS-SLOVAKRIPELists AS30929 as a direct member
AS-SWANRIPELists AS30929 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.