Autonomous system
AS30857 CITC-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Communications, Space & Technology Commission
government regulator saudi-arabia
The AS handle CITC-AS is held by Communications, Space & Technology Commission (CST), the Saudi government regulator for communications, space, and technology.
What it's used for
- The address space carries government regulatory infrastructure, evidenced by netnames
CITC-2andCITC-IXSAregistered to the Commission. - The AS announces 2048 IPv4 addresses across 3 prefixes and 2 IPv6 prefixes, with only 2 observed neighbours, indicating a small, isolated internal network rather than a transit or access provider.
Notable
- All registrants align with the announcer, consistently listing the Communications, Space & Technology Commission (Saudi Arabia).
- The operator was previously known as the Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) before rebranding to CST in December 2022.
- The inventory consists of three IPv4 blocks (86.111.192.0/22, 86.111.196.0/23, 91.206.134.0/23) and two IPv6 prefixes, forming a compact estate typical of a single corporate or governmental entity.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 3 prefixes · 2.05K addresses IPv6 2 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| SA | Saudi Arabia | 5 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS30857- Registry name
- CITC-AS
- Registrant
- KACST-ISU-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cst.gov.sa
- Registered
- 2006-02-21
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 13 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 13 authorising AS30857
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 13 of 13 announcements
- Route objects
- 22 naming AS30857
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 436 networks and 1,771 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere