asn.dev

Routing security

AS30690 KAZEHANA-NETWORKS

Unclassified ARIN NSP

RPKI valid 100% 9 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 10 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS30690 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
23.171.72.0/24RPKI validIRR50
205.173.125.0/24RPKI validIRR52
2602:f99b::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f99b:2::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f99b:3::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f99b:4::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f99b:5::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f99b:a::/48RPKI validIRR34
2602:f99b:a0::/48RPKI validIRR34

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

10 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS30690 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

6 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCDeclaredObserved
AS21738RozintDeclaredObserved
AS31898Oracle CorporationDeclarednot observed
AS37988Alpha Layer Pty LtdDeclaredObserved
AS52025ParadoxNetworks LimitedDeclaredObserved
AS394177SHIFT HOSTING LLCDeclaredObserved
AS34927iFog GmbHnot declaredObserved
AS24482SG.GSnot declaredObserved
AS48185team.blue NVnot declaredObserved
AS25091IP-Max SAnot declaredObserved
AS33891Core-Backbone GmbHnot declaredObserved
AS50300CustodianDC Limitednot declaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS30690 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2602:f99b:c0::/48ARINKazehana Networks LLCMNT-KNL-222026-09-26Not announced
23.171.72.0/24ARIN23.171.72.0/24 via AS30690.MNT-KNL-222024-02-09Announced
205.173.125.0/24ARIN205.173.125.0/24 (Global Anycast) via AS30690.MNT-KNL-222026-04-03Announced
2602:f99b::/48ARIN2602:f99b::/48 via AS30690.MNT-KNL-222024-01-19Announced
2602:f99b:2::/48ARIN2602:f99b:2::/48 via AS30690.MNT-KNL-222024-01-19Announced
2602:f99b:3::/48ARIN2602:f99b:3::/48 via AS30690.MNT-KNL-222024-04-08Announced
2602:f99b:4::/48ARIN2602:f99b:4::/48 (Sydney, AU) via AS30690.MNT-KNL-222025-10-27Announced
2602:f99b:5::/48ARIN2602:f99b:5::/48 (London, UK) via AS30690.MNT-KNL-222025-11-28Announced
2602:f99b:a::/48ARIN2602:f99b:a::/48 via AS30690, global.MNT-KNL-222024-01-19Announced
2602:f99b:a0::/48ARIN2602:f99b:a0::/48 via AS30690, US.MNT-KNL-222024-01-19Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS30690 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS30690:AS-PEERSPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS30690 as a direct member
AS-LONAP-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS30690 as a direct member
AS-LONAP-MLPRIPELists AS30690 as a direct member
AS-LONAP-MLP-V6RIPELists AS30690 as a direct member
AS-ROZINT-DOWNSTREAMARINLists AS30690 as a direct member
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS30690 as a direct member
AS30690:AS-PEERSARINLists AS30690 as a direct member
AS37988:AS-ALPHALAYERAPNICLists AS30690 as a direct member
AS62760:AS-DECIX-ORD-CONNECTEDARINLists AS30690 as a direct member
AS62760:AS-DECIX-ORD-RSARINLists AS30690 as a direct member
AS62760:AS-DECIX-ORD-RS-V6ARINLists AS30690 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-14 18:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-14. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.