asn.dev

Routing security

AS30517 GREAT-LAKES-COMNET

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 23 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 23 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 91% 0 missing · 2 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

23 observed

Every prefix observed with AS30517 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
12.27.195.0/24No ROAIRR other origin51
2606:9780::/32No ROAIRR other origin29
35.128.0.0/18No ROAIRR52
35.128.58.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
35.128.60.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
64.85.144.0/20No ROAIRR52
64.85.160.0/21No ROAIRR52
72.35.40.0/21No ROAIRR52
72.35.48.0/20No ROAIRR52
172.87.32.0/22No ROAIRR51
209.165.240.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
209.165.241.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
209.165.244.0/22No ROAIRR covering51
209.165.245.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
209.165.247.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
209.165.248.0/21No ROAIRR covering52
209.165.248.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
216.176.0.0/21No ROAIRR52
216.176.16.0/20No ROAIRR52
2604:fe00::/32No ROAIRR29
2604:fe00:1::/48No ROAIRR covering29
2604:fe00:4::/48No ROAIRR covering29
2604:fe00:7::/48No ROAIRR covering29

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS30517 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
148.59.61.0/24/24ARIN
170.76.195.0/24/24ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 4 not announced

Route objects naming AS30517 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
170.76.195.0/24ARINNSF InternationalMNT-NSFIN2026-05-12Not announced
170.76.195.0/24RADBNSF InternationalMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Not announced
204.74.200.0/22RADBMeijerMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Not announced
209.165.240.0/20RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Not announced
35.128.0.0/18RADBEverstreamMAINT-AS305172025-11-18Announced
64.85.144.0/20RADBProxy Registered on Behalf of AS19009MAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced
64.85.160.0/21RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced
72.35.40.0/21RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced
72.35.48.0/20RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced
172.87.32.0/22RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced
216.176.0.0/21RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced
216.176.16.0/20RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced
2604:fe00::/32RADBEverstream Solutions LLCMAINT-AS305172023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS30517 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-30517-ASSOCIATEDRADBLists AS30517 as a direct member
AS174:AS-COGC-030RADBLists AS30517 as a direct member
AS61180:AS-PEERS-AMSIXRIPELists AS30517 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.