Autonomous system
AS29355 KCELL-AS
Unclassified RIPE NSP
Summary
Kcell (Kazakhstan)
isp mobile eyeball
Kcell JSC (KCELL-AS) — one of Kazakhstan's largest mobile operators.
What it's used for
- Mobile data for Kcell subscribers across Kazakhstan.
Notable
- An "eyeball" network: addresses here are mobile devices, commonly behind carrier-grade NAT, not servers.
- Distinct from the fixed incumbent Kazakhtelecom AS9198; Kcell is now part of the Kazakhtelecom group.
Interesting
- Kcell operated for years in partnership with TeliaSonera before Kazakhtelecom acquired a controlling stake in 2018.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-20, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 37 prefixes · 633K addresses IPv6 15 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KZ | Kazakhstan | 52 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS29355- Registry name
- KCELL-AS
- Registrant
- KCELL-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@kcell.kz
- Registered
- 2003-08-15
- Last changed
- 2026-05-08
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- KCell JSC
- Also known as
- АО "Кселл"
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Asia Pacific
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Selective
- IRR as-set
AS-KCELL-KZ- Present at
- 3 exchanges
- Website
- http://www.kcell.kz
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 2,532 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2,564 authorising AS29355
- ASPA
- 2 declared providers
- IRR
- 100.0% registered · 2,531 of 2,532 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 1,211 naming AS29355
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,778 prefixes, as published 2026-10-20. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere