Routing security
AS275007 AS275007 - CAP189
Unclassified LACNIC
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS275007 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2803:d330::/32 | No ROA | No IRR | 29 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS275007 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
| AS | Network | ASPA | Routing paths |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS267823 | ATENEA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A.S | Declared | Observed |
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS275007 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
No route objects name this AS as origin.
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS275007 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS-NWN-TRANSIT | RADB | Lists AS275007 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-24 19:55 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-24. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.