Routing security
AS274506 AS274506 - Netcom servicos de telecomunicacoes
Unclassified RIPE
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS274506 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2804:9538:400::/38 | RPKI valid | No IRR | 18 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS274506 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 2804:9538::/32 | /48 | LACNIC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
| AS | Network | ASPA | Routing paths |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS61922 | CNX TELECOM | Declared | Observed |
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS274506 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
No route objects name this AS as origin.
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS274506 directly show who expects to carry it.
No as-set lists this AS directly.
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-08 13:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-08. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.