asn.dev

Routing security

AS272418 INFORLIMA TELECOMUNICACAO EIRELI

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 20 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 75% 5 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 20 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS272418 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
186.65.76.0/23RPKI validNo IRR53
186.65.76.0/24RPKI validNo IRR53
186.65.77.0/24RPKI validNo IRR53
186.65.78.0/24RPKI validNo IRR53
186.65.79.0/24RPKI validNo IRR53
2804:80e0::/33RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:1000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:2000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:3000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:4000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:5000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:6000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:7000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:8000::/33RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:8000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:9000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:a000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:b000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:80e0:c000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

20 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS272418 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

1 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS272418 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2804:80e0::/32RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS272418 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-9RADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-269595RADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS52720RADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-TELYRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS-UFLA-TRANSCUSTRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS264162:AS-NCBRASIL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS267035:AS-CONERADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS269595:AS-CONERADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS52873:AS-TRANSITRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS52995:AS-TENINTERNET-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOMRADBLists AS272418 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.