asn.dev

Routing security

AS271591 TOP NET SERVICOS DE PROVEDOR LTDA - ME

Unclassified LACNIC

RPKI valid 92% 11 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 1 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 92% 0 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS271591 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2804:85d8::/32No ROAIRR other origin29
190.9.80.0/22RPKI validIRR53
190.9.80.0/23RPKI validIRR covering52
190.9.80.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.9.81.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
190.9.82.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
190.9.82.0/24RPKI validIRR52
190.9.83.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
2804:7dec::/32RPKI validIRR30
2804:7dec::/48RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:7dec:c008::/45RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:7dec:c010::/45RPKI validIRR covering31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS271591 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
190.9.80.0/22/24LACNIC
2804:7dec::/32/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

3 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS271591 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
190.9.80.0/22RADBAngola Cables proxy-registered route object for customer AS271591MAINT-AS374682023-12-22Announced
190.9.82.0/24RADBRoute object of AS271591 - Client of AS264409 directly or indirectlyMAINT-AS2644092025-11-28Announced
2804:7dec::/32RADBThis is a BR.Digital customer proxy route object that was created because no existing route object with the same origin was found. Please contact bgp@br.digital if you have any questions regarding this object.MAINT-AS148402023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS271591 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS131RADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS-ITSBRASIL-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832RADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS14840:AS-CUSTOMERS-02RADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS263903:AS-TRANSITRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS264144:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS264409:AS-CONERADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS28300:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS52873:AS-APIRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS52873:AS-TRANSITRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM-DDOSRADBLists AS271591 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.