asn.dev

Routing security

AS270838 AS270838 - Neidnet Telecomunicacoes

Unclassified ARIN Network Services

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS270838 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
189.39.180.0/22RPKI validIRR55
189.39.180.0/23RPKI validIRR covering55
189.39.180.0/24RPKI validIRR covering13
189.39.181.0/24RPKI validIRR covering13
189.39.182.0/23RPKI validIRR covering55
189.39.182.0/24RPKI validIRR covering13
189.39.183.0/24RPKI validIRR covering13
2804:7230::/32RPKI validIRR29
2804:7230::/33RPKI validIRR covering18
2804:7230:2000::/44RPKI validIRR covering17
2804:7230:3000::/44RPKI validIRR covering17
2804:7230:8000::/33RPKI validIRR covering18

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS270838 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
189.39.180.0/22/24LACNIC
2804:7230::/32/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS270838 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
189.39.180.0/22RADBCT23979-TELIUMMAINT-AS223812025-10-18Announced
2804:7230::/32RADBCT23979-TELIUMMAINT-AS223812025-10-18Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS270838 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS270838:AS-NEIDNETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-267613RADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS198RADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-7RADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-ITXBR1RADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-MEGATELECOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-SB-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-TELIUM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS-UFLA-TRANSCUSTRADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS264409:AS-CONERADBLists AS270838 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS270838 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-11 13:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-11. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.