asn.dev

Routing security

AS270397 CELNEET TELECOM

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 5 of 5 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

5 observed

Every prefix observed with AS270397 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
190.89.232.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.89.233.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
190.89.234.0/24RPKI validIRR54
190.89.235.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
2804:6b64::/32RPKI validIRR30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS270397 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
190.89.232.0/24/24LACNIC
190.89.233.0/24/24LACNIC
190.89.234.0/24/24LACNIC
190.89.235.0/24/24LACNIC
2804:6b64::/32/32LACNIC
2804:6b64::/33/33LACNIC
2804:6b64::/34/34LACNIC
2804:6b64:4000::/34/34LACNIC
2804:6b64:8000::/33/33LACNIC
2804:6b64:8000::/34/34LACNIC
2804:6b64:8000::/40/40LACNIC
2804:6b64:c000::/34/34LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS270397 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
190.89.232.0/22RADBAS270397MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Not announced
2804:6b64:8000::/40RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302025-04-16Not announced
190.89.234.0/24RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302024-09-26Announced
2804:6b64::/32RADBAS270397MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS270397 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-1TELECOM-CUSTOMERS01RADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS177RADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-9RADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS266302RADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS266516RADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-TELYRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS-TELY-TRANSITRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS14840:AS-CUSTOMERS-02RADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS263327:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS264221:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS267587:AS-VELFIBRA-NETRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS270397:AS-CONERADBLists AS270397 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOMRADBLists AS270397 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-21 12:00 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-21. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.