asn.dev

Routing security

AS269523 Life Connections

Residential LACNIC Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 100% 16 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS269523 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.188.68.0/22RPKI validIRR55
45.188.68.0/23RPKI validIRR55
45.188.68.0/24RPKI validIRR covering15
45.188.69.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
45.188.70.0/23RPKI validIRR55
45.188.71.0/24RPKI validIRR55
2804:65ec::/33RPKI validIRR covering28
2804:65ec::/36RPKI validIRR covering19
2804:65ec:1000::/36RPKI validIRR covering19
2804:65ec:2000::/36RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:65ec:2000::/37RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:65ec:2000::/39RPKI validIRR covering19
2804:65ec:3000::/36RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:65ec:3000::/37RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:65ec:3000::/39RPKI validIRR covering19
2804:65ec:8000::/33RPKI validIRR covering31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS269523 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.188.68.0/22/32LACNIC
2804:65ec::/32/128LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS269523 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2804:65ec::/32RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Not announced
45.188.68.0/22RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Announced
45.188.68.0/23RADBRoute object of AS269523 - Client of AS264409 directly or indirectlyMAINT-AS2644092025-12-01Announced
45.188.70.0/23RADBRoute object of AS269523 - Client of AS264409 directly or indirectlyMAINT-AS2644092025-12-01Announced
45.188.71.0/24RADBRoute object of AS269523 - Client of AS264409 directly or indirectlyMAINT-AS2644092025-12-01Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS269523 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS269523:AS-ALLPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-AS10429-CLIENTESRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS217RADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-9RADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-GNT-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-K2TELECOM-COSTUMERSRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-263928RADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-SEABORN-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS-UFLA-TRANSCUSTRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS264409:AS-CONERADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS28220:AS-TRANSITRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS52320:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS269523 as a direct member
AS52925:AS-CONERADBLists AS269523 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-24 19:55 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-24. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.