asn.dev

Routing security

AS269359 CANAA TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA - ME

Residential LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 21 of 21 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 28 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

21 observed

Every prefix observed with AS269359 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.184.68.0/22RPKI validIRR53
45.184.68.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
45.184.68.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
45.184.69.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
45.184.70.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
45.184.71.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
45.230.84.0/23RPKI validIRR52
45.230.84.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
45.230.85.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
168.194.248.0/22RPKI validIRR53
168.194.248.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
168.194.248.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
168.194.249.0/24RPKI validIRR53
168.194.250.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
168.194.250.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
168.194.251.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
2804:6368::/33RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:6368::/34RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:6368::/36RPKI validIRR covering26
2804:6368:4000::/34RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:6368:8000::/33RPKI validIRR covering30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

28 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS269359 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS269359 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2804:6368::/32RADBG8 Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS283292026-08-07Not announced
45.184.68.0/22RADBG8 Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS283292026-08-07Announced
45.230.84.0/23RADBG8 Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS283292026-08-07Announced
168.194.248.0/22RADBAS-NIA-CUSTOMER-269359MAINT-AS2676132025-06-03Announced
168.194.249.0/24ALTDBCANAA - Proxy for OLV CustomerMAINT-AS2669862025-04-04Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS269359 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-266986ALTDBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-267613RADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-271049ALTDBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-53427-TGLOBALRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-8167_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS156RADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-7RADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-TRIALRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-OPENX-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLSRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-SAMMRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS-UDOSRADBLists AS269359 as a direct member
AS264409:AS-CONERADBLists AS269359 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.