asn.dev

Routing security

AS269217 ATTILA ALMEIDA DE AGUIAR ME

Unclassified LACNIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 16 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS269217 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.182.144.0/23No ROAIRR covering52
45.182.144.0/24No ROAIRR covering3
45.182.145.0/24No ROAIRR covering3
45.182.146.0/23No ROAIRR covering52
45.182.146.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
45.182.147.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
2804:6128::/33No ROAIRR covering30
2804:6128:1::/48No ROAIRR covering3
2804:6128:1a0::/44No ROAIRR covering3
2804:6128:80::/44No ROAIRR covering3
2804:6128:90::/44No ROAIRR covering3
2804:6128:190::/44No ROAIRR covering3
2804:6128:1200::/40No ROAIRR covering30
2804:6128:1300::/40No ROAIRR covering30
2804:6128:8000::/33No ROAIRR covering30
2804:6128:fa0::/46No ROAIRR covering3

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS269217 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS269217 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
45.182.144.0/22RADBG8 NetworksMAINT-AS283292026-08-07Not announced
2804:6128::/32RADBG8 NetworksMAINT-AS283292026-08-07Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS269217 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-53427-TGLOBALRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS151RADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-10RADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-RJRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-TRIALRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832RADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOMRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALRADBLists AS269217 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALOORADBLists AS269217 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-27 12:06 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-27. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.