Routing security
AS268944 Martins & Martins Telecom LTDA ME
Residential ARIN
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS268944 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 45.176.140.0/22 | RPKI valid | IRR | 54 |
| 2804:5cfc::/32 | RPKI valid | IRR | 29 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS268944 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 45.176.140.0/22 | /24 | LACNIC |
| 2804:5cfc::/32 | /48 | LACNIC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
| AS | Network | ASPA | Routing paths |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS52965 | 1TELECOM SERVICOS DE TECNOLOGIA EM INTERNET LTDA | Declared | Observed |
| AS264562 | PBR SERVICOS DE TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA | Declared | not observed |
| AS24482 | SG.GS | not declared | Observed |
| AS37721 | Virtual Technologies & Solutions | not declared | Observed |
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS268944 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
| Prefix | Source | Description | Maintainer | Changed | Routing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45.176.140.0/23 | RADB | CLARO S.A. Customer | MAINT-AS4230 | 2023-11-13 | Not announced |
| 45.176.142.0/23 | RADB | CLARO S.A. Customer | MAINT-AS4230 | 2023-11-13 | Not announced |
| 45.176.140.0/22 | RADB | AS268944 | MAINT-AS52965 | 2025-08-12 | Announced |
| 2804:5cfc::/32 | RADB | AS268944 | MAINT-AS52965 | 2025-08-12 | Announced |
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS268944 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS-1TELECOM-CUSTOMERS01 | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-7738_CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS146 | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-6 | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-EMBRATELNET | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-HURRICANE | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832 | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS14840:AS-CUSTOMERS-01 | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS264409:AS-CONE | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS274830:AS-CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM-DDOS | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS61568:AS-TESTE-AL | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALOO | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
AS61621:AS-CONE | RADB | Lists AS268944 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-28 12:15 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-28. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.