asn.dev

Routing security

AS268500 B C INFORMATICA E TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 100% 10 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS268500 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.161.36.0/22RPKI validIRR55
45.161.36.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
45.161.36.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
45.161.37.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
45.161.38.0/23RPKI validIRR covering54
45.161.38.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
45.161.39.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
2804:522c::/32RPKI validIRR30
2804:522c::/33RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:522c:8000::/33RPKI validIRR covering30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS268500 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.161.36.0/22/32LACNIC
2804:522c::/32/128LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS268500 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
45.161.36.0/22ALTDBBCTELECOM IPV4MAINT-AS2685002024-08-24Announced
45.161.36.0/22RADBGlobenet Customer - Telebras - SET SolucoesMAINT-AS523202023-11-13Announced
2804:522c::/32ALTDBBCTELECOM IPV6MAINT-AS2685002024-08-24Announced
2804:522c::/32RADBSAMM - Customer Proxy RouteMAINT-AS223812026-08-07Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS268500 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-263558ALTDBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-267613RADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-53427-TGLOBALRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-53427-TGNRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-8167_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-ACTIONALTDBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS57RADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-3RADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-HWNG-DOWNSTREAMSALTDBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS263558RADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-SAMMRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-TASCOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS263558:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS263903:AS-TRANSITRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS53245:AS-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS268500 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM-DDOSRADBLists AS268500 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-30 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-30. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.