asn.dev

Routing security

AS267039 Dnet tecnologia

Unclassified LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS267039 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
45.228.4.0/22RPKI validIRR55
45.228.4.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
45.228.5.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
45.228.6.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
45.228.7.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
2804:4738::/32RPKI validIRR32
2804:4738::/33RPKI validIRR32
2804:4738::/34RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:4738:4000::/34RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:4738:8000::/33RPKI validIRR32
2804:4738:8000::/34RPKI validIRR covering31
2804:4738:c000::/34RPKI validIRR covering31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS267039 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.228.4.0/22/24LACNIC
2804:4738::/32/34LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS267039 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
45.228.4.0/23RADBAS267039MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Not announced
45.228.6.0/23RADBAS267039MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Not announced
45.228.4.0/22RADBAS-VEC -CUSTOMER-267039MAINT-AS2676132025-08-11Announced
2804:4738::/32RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Announced
2804:4738::/33RADBAS267039MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Announced
2804:4738:8000::/33RADBAS267039MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS267039 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-1TELECOM-CUSTOMERS01RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-262740-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-265135ALTDBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-267613RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS127RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-6RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-ITXBRRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS267039RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-SEABORN-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-TELYRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS267039 as a direct member
AS14840:AS-CUSTOMERS-04RADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS262468:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS264409:AS-CONERADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS274830:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOMRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM-DDOSRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALRADBLists AS267039 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALOORADBLists AS267039 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-28 12:15 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-28. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.