Routing security
AS266409 SECW TELECOM
Unclassified APNIC NSP
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS266409 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 170.81.68.0/22 | RPKI valid | IRR | 51 |
| 170.81.68.0/23 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 51 |
| 170.81.68.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 51 |
| 170.81.69.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 51 |
| 170.81.70.0/23 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 51 |
| 170.81.70.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 51 |
| 2804:3764::/32 | RPKI valid | IRR | 30 |
| 2804:3764:1a70::/44 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:1a80::/44 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:40::/44 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 31 |
| 2804:3764:100::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:500::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 18 |
| 2804:3764:803a::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:8039::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:e000::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:e001::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:fffa::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
| 2804:3764:fffd::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR covering | 30 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS266409 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 170.81.68.0/22 | /24 | LACNIC |
| 2804:3764::/32 | /48 | LACNIC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS266409 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
| Prefix | Source | Description | Maintainer | Changed | Routing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 170.81.68.0/22 | RADB | CUSTOMER SECW TELECOM | MAINT-AS61832 | 2025-01-22 | Announced |
| 2804:3764::/32 | RADB | WIX | MAINT-AS53013 | 2023-11-13 | Announced |
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS266409 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS-SECW | PeeringDB | Declared by the operator as its own set |
AS-267613 | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-8167-BGP-CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-8167_CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-ADYLNET-CUSTOMERS | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-ALIANCANET | ALTDB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS168 | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-2 | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMER | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMER | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS53158 | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-SECW | ALTDB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASIL | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS271691:AS-UPSTREAMS | ALTDB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
AS53013:AS-CONE | RADB | Lists AS266409 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.