asn.dev

Routing security

AS266195 ERIC BG COMUNICACAO MULTIMIDIA - ME

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 100% 10 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS266195 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
190.123.200.0/22RPKI validIRR53
190.123.200.0/23RPKI validIRR53
190.123.202.0/23RPKI validIRR53
2804:3c30::/32RPKI validIRR33
2804:3c30::/33RPKI validIRR33
2804:3c30::/34RPKI validIRR covering3
2804:3c30:4000::/34RPKI validIRR covering3
2804:3c30:8000::/33RPKI validIRR33
2804:3c30:8000::/34RPKI validIRR covering3
2804:3c30:c000::/34RPKI validIRR covering3

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS266195 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
190.123.200.0/22/32LACNIC
2804:3c30::/32/128LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS266195 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
190.123.200.0/22RADBProxy-registered route objectMAINT-AS81672025-03-22Announced
190.123.200.0/23RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302023-11-13Announced
190.123.202.0/23RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302023-11-13Announced
2804:3c30::/32RADBITX-DB3MAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced
2804:3c30::/33RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302023-11-13Announced
2804:3c30:8000::/33RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS266195 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS183RADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-9RADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-DDOSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-HUGENET-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-ITSBRASIL-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-269595RADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS266195RADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832RADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS267035:AS-CONERADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS269595:AS-CONERADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS274830:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS52873:AS-TRANSITRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS52995:AS-TENINTERNET-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOMRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM-DDOSRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALRADBLists AS266195 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALOORADBLists AS266195 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.