asn.dev

Routing security

AS265369 C-ComTelecom Servios Ltda-ME

Residential LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 16 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 16 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 6 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS265369 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
24.152.108.0/22RPKI validNo IRR51
24.152.108.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
24.152.110.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
138.118.44.0/22RPKI validNo IRR51
138.118.47.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
168.205.100.0/22RPKI validNo IRR51
168.205.102.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
187.121.236.0/22RPKI validNo IRR53
189.36.208.0/21RPKI validNo IRR52
189.36.211.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
189.36.214.0/24RPKI validNo IRR52
189.36.215.0/24RPKI validNo IRR51
2804:2ed4::/32RPKI validNo IRR30
2804:2ed4:7c00::/38RPKI validNo IRR30
2804:2ed4:4400::/38RPKI validNo IRR29
2804:2ed4:4800::/38RPKI validNo IRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

6 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS265369 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
24.152.108.0/22/32LACNIC
138.118.44.0/22/32LACNIC
168.205.100.0/22/32LACNIC
187.121.236.0/22/32LACNIC
189.36.208.0/21/32LACNIC
2804:2ed4::/32/128LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS265369 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS265369 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-263009-FORTE-TCMRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS93RADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-7RADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-GBLXRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-TRIALRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-DOWNSTREAMSRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-HUGENET-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-ITXBRRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-ITXBR1RADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-K2TELECOM-COSTUMERSRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-MEGATELECOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832RADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-SUMICITY-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS-TUDDO-CLIRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS264409:AS-CONERADBLists AS265369 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOMRADBLists AS265369 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.