asn.dev

Routing security

AS264874 A G DOS SANTOS LIMA ME

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 17 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 17 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

17 observed

Every prefix observed with AS264874 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
168.227.64.0/22No ROAIRR52
168.227.64.0/23No ROAIRR covering52
168.227.64.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
168.227.65.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
168.227.66.0/23No ROAIRR covering52
168.227.66.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
168.227.67.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
2804:2f24::/32No ROAIRR33
2804:2f24:1::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:2::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:3::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:4::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:5::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:6::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:7::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:8::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:2f24:9::/48No ROAIRR covering30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS264874 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS264874 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
168.227.64.0/22RADBAS264874MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Announced
2804:2f24::/32RADBAS264874MAINT-AS529652025-08-12Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS264874 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-1TELECOM-CUSTOMERS01RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-263073-CUSTRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS184RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS93RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-9RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-FORTEL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-GNT-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS266302RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS266516RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-MOB-CUSTOMER-AS61832RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-TELYRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS-TELY-TRANSIT:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS14840:AS-CUSTOMERS-02RADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS274830:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS52320:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOMRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-ALOO-TELECOM-DDOSRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALRADBLists AS264874 as a direct member
AS61568:AS-TESTE-ALOORADBLists AS264874 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-18 12:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-18. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.