asn.dev

Routing security

AS264851 IFOTONCORP S.A.

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 19 of 19 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

19 observed

Every prefix observed with AS264851 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
170.83.216.0/24RPKI validIRR51
170.83.217.0/24RPKI validIRR52
170.83.218.0/24RPKI validIRR51
170.83.219.0/24RPKI validIRR52
2803:b2c0::/32RPKI validIRR29
2803:b2c0::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1100::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1102::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1104::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1105::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1106::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1108::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:1109::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:2100::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:2101::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:2204::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:2301::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2803:b2c0:6100::/48RPKI validIRR covering29

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS264851 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
170.83.216.0/22/24LACNIC
2803:b2c0::/32/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS264851 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
170.83.216.0/22RADBAXESATMAINT-AS235202023-11-13Not announced
170.83.216.0/24RADBIFOTONCORPMAINT-AS191692023-11-13Announced
170.83.217.0/24RADBIFOTONCORPMAINT-AS191692023-11-13Announced
170.83.218.0/24RADBIFOTONCORPMAINT-AS191692023-11-13Announced
170.83.219.0/24RADBIFOTONCORPMAINT-AS191692023-11-13Announced
2803:b2c0::/32RADBCOLUMBUS NETWORKS TRANSIT CUSTOMERSMAINT-AS235202023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS264851 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ASTRA-NETRIPELists AS264851 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS96RADBLists AS264851 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-10RADBLists AS264851 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS264851 as a direct member
AS-NWN-TRANSITRADBLists AS264851 as a direct member
AS-SES-NETRIPELists AS264851 as a direct member
AS-TELCONET-TRANSIT-ASRADBLists AS264851 as a direct member
AS-UFLA-TRANSCUSTRADBLists AS264851 as a direct member
AS19114:AS-CUSTOMERSLACNICLists AS264851 as a direct member
AS23487:AS-CLIENTESLACNICLists AS264851 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.