asn.dev

Routing security

AS264684 Telefonica del Peru S.A.A.

Unclassified LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 26 of 26 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 1 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

26 observed

Every prefix observed with AS264684 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2001:1388:8a00::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a0a::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a0c::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a0d::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a01::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a02::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a03::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a04::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a05::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a06::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a07::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a08::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a09::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a40::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a41::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a42::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a43::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a44::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a46::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a60::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a61::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a62::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a63::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a80::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a81::/48RPKI validIRR covering29
2001:1388:8a82::/48RPKI validIRR covering29

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

1 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS264684 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2001:1388::/32/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

1 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS264684 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2001:1388::/32LACNICLACNIC generated route6 for INTEGRATEL PERÚ S.A.A.MNT-PE-TPSA-LACNIC2026-10-12Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS264684 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS6147:AS-TEFPERULACNICLists AS264684 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, collected 2026-10-17. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.