asn.dev

Routing security

AS264577 REDE WINET TELECOM

Residential LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 14 of 14 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

14 observed

Every prefix observed with AS264577 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
138.36.116.0/22RPKI validIRR54
138.36.116.0/23RPKI validIRR covering14
138.36.116.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
138.36.117.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
138.36.118.0/23RPKI validIRR52
138.36.118.0/24RPKI validIRR covering14
138.36.119.0/24RPKI validIRR covering14
2804:21d8::/32RPKI validIRR30
2804:21d8::/33RPKI validIRR covering29
2804:21d8::/34RPKI validIRR covering19
2804:21d8:4000::/34RPKI validIRR covering19
2804:21d8:8000::/33RPKI validIRR covering29
2804:21d8:8000::/34RPKI validIRR covering19
2804:21d8:c000::/34RPKI validIRR covering19

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS264577 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
138.36.116.0/22/32LACNIC
2804:21d8::/32/128LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

3 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS264577 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
138.36.116.0/22RADBITX-GRUPOHOSTMAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced
138.36.118.0/23RADBCLARO S.A. CustomerMAINT-AS42302025-01-10Announced
2804:21d8::/32RADBITX-GRUPOHOSTMAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS264577 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-7738-BGP-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-7738_CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS30RADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-LINKFULL-CORPORATERADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-REDFOX-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-TELIUM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-UFLA-TRANSCUSTRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS-UPIX-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS14840:AS-CUSTOMERS-04RADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS263985:AS-DZ7TELECOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264577 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS264577 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-23 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-23. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.