asn.dev

Routing security

AS264191 Eagnet Telecomunicacoes Eireli-Me

Residential LACNIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 13 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS264191 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
138.97.188.0/22No ROAIRR47
138.97.188.0/23No ROAIRR covering47
138.97.188.0/24No ROAIRR covering46
138.97.189.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
138.97.190.0/23No ROAIRR covering47
138.97.190.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
138.97.191.0/24No ROAIRR51
2804:23e4::/32No ROAIRR30
2804:23e4:29::/48No ROAIRR covering30
2804:23e4:100::/40No ROAIRR covering30
2804:23e4:200::/40No ROAIRR covering30
2804:23e4:400::/40No ROAIRR covering30
2804:23e4:500::/40No ROAIRR covering30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS264191 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS264191 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
138.97.188.0/22NTTCOMProxy Route For ASN264191MAINT-AS2639492017-02-08Announced
138.97.188.0/22RADBITX_GRUPO G1MAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced
138.97.191.0/24RADBAS264191MAINT-AS615992023-11-13Announced
2804:23e4::/32RADBThis is a BR.Digital customer proxy route object that was created because no existing route object with the same origin was found. Please contact bgp@br.digital if you have any questions regarding this object.MAINT-AS148402023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS264191 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-267613RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS184RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS37RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS82RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-5RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-RJRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-ITXBR1RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-MEGABRNTTCOMLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-MEGATELECOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-RLINE:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS266872:AS-TEMAISARGLACNICLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS28146:AS-CLIENTSRADBLists AS264191 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS264191 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.