asn.dev

Routing security

AS263900 AS263900 - CHNET Telecom

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS263900 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
138.204.148.0/22RPKI validIRR53
138.204.148.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
138.204.148.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
138.204.149.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
138.204.150.0/23RPKI validIRR covering53
138.204.150.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
138.204.151.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
2804:276c::/32RPKI validIRR30
2804:276c::/34RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:276c:4000::/34RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:276c:8000::/34RPKI validIRR covering30
2804:276c:c000::/34RPKI validIRR covering30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS263900 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
138.204.148.0/22/22LACNIC
138.204.148.0/23/23LACNIC
138.204.148.0/24/24LACNIC
138.204.149.0/24/24LACNIC
138.204.150.0/23/23LACNIC
138.204.150.0/24/24LACNIC
138.204.151.0/24/24LACNIC
2804:276c::/32/32LACNIC
2804:276c::/34/34LACNIC
2804:276c:4000::/34/34LACNIC
2804:276c:8000::/34/34LACNIC
2804:276c:c000::/34/34LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS263900 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
138.204.148.0/22RADBRoute object of AS263900 - Client of AS264409 directly or indirectlyMAINT-AS2644092026-01-20Announced
2804:276c::/32RADBITX-CPNETMAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS263900 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-267613RADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS132RADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-5RADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-HWNG-DOWNSTREAMSALTDBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-ITXBR1RADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS28146:AS-CLIENTSRADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS263900 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS263900 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-08 13:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-08. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.