asn.dev

Routing security

AS263359 Cybertech Informatica LTDA

Unclassified LACNIC

RPKI valid 100% 16 of 16 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

16 observed

Every prefix observed with AS263359 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
191.37.128.0/21RPKI validIRR53
191.37.128.0/22RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.128.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.129.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.130.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.131.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.132.0/22RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.132.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.133.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.134.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
191.37.135.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
2804:14ec::/32RPKI validIRR34
2804:14ec::/34RPKI validIRR covering34
2804:14ec:4000::/34RPKI validIRR covering34
2804:14ec:8000::/34RPKI validIRR covering34
2804:14ec:c000::/34RPKI validIRR covering34

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS263359 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
191.37.128.0/21/24LACNIC
2804:14ec::/32/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS263359 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
191.37.128.0/21RADBITX-GRUPOG1MAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced
2804:14ec::/32RADBSolicitado por nuestro cliente IPE para Cybertech. junio 12 2014MAINT-AS186782023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS263359 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-263359RADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-267613RADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS115RADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-5RADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-CYBERTECHRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-E1-AUTOMATION-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-RJRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-ITXBR1RADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-MEGATELECOM-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS28146:AS-CLIENTSRADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS3491:AS-CUSTOMERS-NARADBLists AS263359 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS263359 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-15 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-15. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.