asn.dev

Routing security

AS262841 M.A. INFORMATICA LTDA

Residential APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 20 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 30% 14 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 5 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS262841 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
168.228.76.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
168.228.76.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
168.228.78.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
177.136.216.0/21RPKI validNo IRR52
177.136.216.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
177.136.218.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
177.136.220.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
177.136.222.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
186.250.60.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
186.250.60.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
186.250.62.0/23RPKI validNo IRR3
2804:7534::/32RPKI validNo IRR33
2804:7534::/33RPKI validNo IRR4
2804:7534:8000::/33RPKI validNo IRR4
177.10.24.0/22RPKI validIRR covering52
177.10.24.0/23RPKI validIRR covering3
177.10.26.0/23RPKI validIRR covering3
177.10.28.0/22RPKI validIRR covering52
177.10.28.0/23RPKI validIRR covering3
177.10.30.0/23RPKI validIRR covering3

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

5 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS262841 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
168.228.76.0/22/24LACNIC
177.10.24.0/21/24LACNIC
177.136.216.0/21/24LACNIC
186.250.60.0/22/24LACNIC
2804:7534::/32/48LACNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

1 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS262841 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
177.10.24.0/21RADBG8 NetworksMAINT-AS283292026-08-07Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS262841 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-11835-CUSTOMERSNTTCOMLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-18881-CUSTOMERS1RADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-267613RADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSALTDBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-53062-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-AMPERNET-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS155RADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS4RADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-CTBC-TOOLS-1RADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-DECIX-SAO-CONNECTEDARINLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-DURAND1-CUSTOMERRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-EMBRATELNETRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-FLYSRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-FORTE-TELECOM-CUSTOMER-RJRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-HUGENET-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-OPENX-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-ROCKETNETWORK-TOOLS-2RADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS-UFINET-LATAM-BRASILRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS28146:AS-CLIENTSRADBLists AS262841 as a direct member
AS53013:AS-CONERADBLists AS262841 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-23 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-23. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.