asn.dev

Routing security

AS25534 INTELSOFT-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS25534 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:1a08::/32RPKI validIRR34
185.146.16.0/22RPKI validIRR54
185.146.16.0/23RPKI validIRR covering56
217.15.176.0/20RPKI validIRR54
217.15.176.0/22RPKI validIRR54
217.15.180.0/22RPKI validIRR54
217.15.184.0/22RPKI validIRR54
217.15.188.0/22RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS25534 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
185.146.16.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.146.16.0/23/24RIPENCC
217.15.176.0/20/24RIPENCC
217.15.176.0/22/24RIPENCC
217.15.180.0/22/24RIPENCC
217.15.184.0/22/24RIPENCC
217.15.188.0/22/24RIPENCC
2a00:1a08::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS25534 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
217.15.180.0/24RIPE—ASAL2016-08-19Not announced
185.146.16.0/22RIPE—AS25534-MNT2016-05-23Announced
217.15.176.0/20RADBPACNET (proxy-registered route object)MAINT-AS46372023-11-13Announced
217.15.176.0/20RIPEIntelsoft KazakstanAS25534-MNT2005-08-23Announced
217.15.176.0/22RIPEIntelsoft KazakstanAS25534-MNT2009-06-25Announced
217.15.180.0/22RIPE—ASAL2016-08-19Announced
217.15.184.0/22RIPEIntelsoft KazakstanAS25534-MNT2009-06-25Announced
217.15.188.0/22RIPEIntelsoft KazakstanAS25534-MNT2009-09-24Announced
2a00:1a08::/32RIPEIntelsoft KazakstanAS25534-MNT2011-04-15Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS25534 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-DIMEDIARIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-HOSTKEYBVRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-INTELSATUSRADBLists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-INTELSOFTRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-INTELSOFT-PEERSRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-KAZEXCHANGERIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-MTELEPORTRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-NCONNECTRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-OPENMEDIA-PEERSRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-ROSPRINTRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-TRANSKZRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-TRANSKZ-IPV6RIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member
AS41194:AS-RASCOMRIPELists AS25534 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-20 11:55 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-20. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.