asn.dev

Routing security

AS25512 CDT-AS The Czech Republic

Unclassified RIPE NSP

RPKI valid 100% 14 of 14 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 14 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

14 observed

Every prefix observed with AS25512 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
81.19.32.0/20RPKI validIRR52
82.117.128.0/19RPKI validIRR52
82.202.64.0/18RPKI validIRR52
85.13.64.0/18RPKI validIRR52
85.184.16.0/20RPKI validIRR52
85.209.124.0/23RPKI validIRR4
89.203.128.0/17RPKI validIRR52
91.234.162.0/23RPKI validIRR4
131.117.192.0/21RPKI validIRR52
185.134.0.0/22RPKI validIRR51
195.146.96.0/19RPKI validIRR52
212.11.96.0/19RPKI validIRR52
213.235.128.0/18RPKI validIRR52
2001:1a48::/32RPKI validIRR29

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

14 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS25512 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
81.19.32.0/20/20RIPENCC
82.117.128.0/19/19RIPENCC
82.202.64.0/18/18RIPENCC
85.13.64.0/18/18RIPENCC
85.184.16.0/20/20RIPENCC
85.209.124.0/23/23RIPENCC
89.203.128.0/17/17RIPENCC
91.234.162.0/23/23RIPENCC
131.117.192.0/21/21RIPENCC
185.134.0.0/22/22RIPENCC
195.146.96.0/19/19RIPENCC
212.11.96.0/19/19RIPENCC
213.235.128.0/18/18RIPENCC
2001:1a48::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

14 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS25512 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
81.19.32.0/20RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2006-07-07Announced
82.117.128.0/19RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2006-07-07Announced
82.202.64.0/18RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2009-11-12Announced
85.13.64.0/18RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2006-07-07Announced
85.184.16.0/20RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2017-02-03Announced
85.209.124.0/23RIPE—WIA-AS-MNT2021-02-12Announced
89.203.128.0/17RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2006-07-07Announced
91.234.162.0/23RIPEIFIBERCZ via CDTCDT-MNT2018-01-22Announced
131.117.192.0/21RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2014-01-29Announced
185.134.0.0/22RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2020-01-28Announced
195.146.96.0/19RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2009-11-12Announced
212.11.96.0/19RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2009-11-12Announced
213.235.128.0/18RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2009-11-12Announced
2001:1a48::/32RIPECD-Telematika a.s.CDT-MNT2011-01-17Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS25512 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CDT-NETWORKSPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-43413_NT-NIXRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member
AS-CDT-FENIXRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member
AS-CDT-NETWORKSRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member
AS-CESNET-NIX-PEERSRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member
AS-TO2-NIX-PEERRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member
AS24971:AS-MAI-NIX-PEERRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member
AS42000:AS-NIXCZ-PEERINGSRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member
AS8251:AS-NIX-PEERINGSRIPELists AS25512 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-29 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-29. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.