asn.dev

Routing security

AS25375 LEU-AS

Residential ARIN Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 100% 8 of 8 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

8 observed

Every prefix observed with AS25375 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:aac0::/29RPKI validIRR34
2a0a:69c0::/29RPKI validIRR34
37.131.184.0/21RPKI validIRR51
109.71.88.0/21RPKI validIRR51
185.33.248.0/22RPKI validIRR51
185.196.84.0/22RPKI validIRR51
193.246.110.0/23RPKI validIRR51
212.203.32.0/19RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS25375 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
37.131.184.0/21/21RIPENCC
109.71.88.0/21/21RIPENCC
185.33.248.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.196.84.0/22/22RIPENCC
193.246.110.0/23/23RIPENCC
212.203.32.0/19/19RIPENCC
2a00:aac0::/29/29RIPENCC
2a0a:69c0::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

9 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS25375 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0a:69c4::/30RIPELeunet AGCH-STAFAG-1-MNT2018-08-25Not announced
37.131.184.0/21RIPELeunet AGLEUNET-SECURITY-MNT2012-02-27Announced
109.71.88.0/21RIPELeunet AGLEUNET-SECURITY-MNT2017-01-16Announced
185.33.248.0/22RIPELeunet AGLEUNET-SECURITY-MNT2017-01-16Announced
185.196.84.0/22RIPELeucom Stafag AGLEUNET-SECURITY-MNT2017-03-28Announced
193.246.110.0/23RIPELeunet Second PathLEUNET-SECURITY-MNT2004-04-26Announced
212.203.32.0/19RIPELeunet AGLEUNET-SECURITY-MNT2003-09-09Announced
2a00:aac0::/29RIPE—CH-STAFAG-1-MNT2019-10-08Announced
2a0a:69c0::/29RIPELeunet AGCH-STAFAG-1-MNT2018-08-25Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS25375 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CABLECOMRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS-FINECOM-PEERS-SWISSIXRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS25375 as a direct member
AS-IMPNETRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS-JAGUAR-PEERING-V6-SWISS-IXRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS-LEUNETRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS-OPSONE:AS-PEERINGRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS15547:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS25091:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS29097:AS-HOSTPOINT-SWISSIX-IPV6-PEERSRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS29097:AS-HOSTPOINT-SWISSIX-PEERSRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS29169:AS-PEERS4RIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS29169:AS-PEERS6RIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS30781:AS-JAGUAR-PEERING-SWISS-IXRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS30781:AS-JAGUAR-PEERING-V6-SWISS-IXRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS42476:AS-SWISSIXRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS42476:AS-SWISSIX-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS42476:AS-SWISSIX-V6RIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS8508:AS-SASK-UPC-INRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member
AS8821:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS25375 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-14 18:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-14. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.