Autonomous system
AS23911 CNGI-BJIX-AS-AP China Next Generation Internet Beijing IX
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
China Next Generation Internet Beijing IX
education transit china cernet
CNGI-BJIX-AS-AP is operated by China Next Generation Internet Beijing IX.
What it's used for
- The address space carries CERNET infrastructure, with both IPv4 prefixes registered under the netname
CERNET-CN-PIand registrantIRT-CERNET-AP. - The AS announces 512 IPv4 addresses across 2 prefixes and 1 IPv6 prefix, while maintaining 20 observed neighbours. This ratio of limited address space to a moderate number of peering partners suggests a transit or interconnection role within the Chinese education network rather than a large-scale access provider.
Notable
- The registrants for the announced IPv4 prefixes (
IRT-CERNET-AP) align with the CERNET identity implied by the AS handle and netnames, indicating consistent ownership of the address space. - The inventory consists of two contiguous /24 blocks in the 210.25.0.0/16 range and a single /32 IPv6 prefix, representing a small, focused allocation typical of a specific network segment or exchange point.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Hong Kong Internet Exchange | Hong Kong, China | 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a1be |
Transit providers
4 upstream, 7 downstream and 23 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS23911- Registry name
- CNGI-BJIX-AS-AP
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cernet.edu.cn
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2020-09-03
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 3 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS23911
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 0% registered · 0 of 3 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 4 naming AS23911
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere