asn.dev

Routing security

AS22644 TJUH

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 100% 22 of 22 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 2 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

22 observed

Every prefix observed with AS22644 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
147.140.0.0/18RPKI validIRR55
147.140.80.0/20RPKI validIRR55
147.140.96.0/19RPKI validIRR55
147.140.128.0/17RPKI validIRR55
147.140.255.0/24RPKI validIRR52
2605:2c0::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:1::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:1000::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:1001::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:3000::/40RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:4000::/36RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:5000::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:5008::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:5009::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6000::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6001::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6010::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6100::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6101::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6110::/48RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6200::/40RPKI validIRR covering30
2605:2c0:6300::/40RPKI validIRR covering30

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

2 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS22644 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
147.140.0.0/16/32ARIN
2605:2c0::/32/48ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 5 not announced

Route objects naming AS22644 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
147.140.0.0/16ARIN833 Chestnut Street, Suite 600MNT-TJU-2-Z2024-03-07Not announced
147.140.0.0/16RADBThomas Jefferson UniversityMAINT-AS275062025-02-20Not announced
147.140.64.32/27ARIN833 Chestnut Street, Suite 600MNT-TJU-2-Z2024-03-07Not announced
147.140.64.64/27ARIN833 Chestnut Street, Suite 600MNT-TJU-2-Z2024-03-07Not announced
2605:2c0::/32ARINThomas Jefferson UniversityMNT-TJU2026-02-10Not announced
147.140.0.0/18RADB—MAINT-AS275062025-09-03Announced
147.140.80.0/20RADB—MAINT-AS275062025-09-03Announced
147.140.96.0/19RADB—MAINT-AS275062025-09-03Announced
147.140.128.0/17RADB—MAINT-AS275062025-09-03Announced
147.140.255.0/24RADBThomas Jefferson UniversityMAINT-AS275062025-04-28Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS22644 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CCFRADBLists AS22644 as a direct member
AS-CCF-TESTRADBLists AS22644 as a direct member
AS-COMCAST-EDIARADBLists AS22644 as a direct member
AS-KINBERARINLists AS22644 as a direct member
AS-PENNRENARINLists AS22644 as a direct member
AS399855:AS-CONEARINLists AS22644 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-19 12:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-19. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.