asn.dev

Routing security

AS216245 CYBERJET

Unclassified RIPE Content

RPKI valid 100% 20 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 90% 0 missing · 2 other origin
ROAs 7 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS216245 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a13:edc0:26::/48RPKI validIRR other origin34
2a13:edc0:662::/48RPKI validIRR other origin33
2a13:edc0::/44RPKI validIRR34
2a13:edc0::/47RPKI validIRR32
2a13:edc0:1::/48RPKI validIRR32
2a13:edc0:20::/48RPKI validIRR33
2a13:edc0:50::/48RPKI validIRR30
2a13:edc0:100::/40RPKI validIRR33
2a13:edc0:200::/40RPKI validIRR32
2a13:edc0:201::/48RPKI validIRR covering21
195.172.136.0/22RPKI validIRR covering54
195.172.136.0/24RPKI validIRR covering19
195.172.137.0/24RPKI validIRR covering19
195.172.138.0/24RPKI validIRR covering19
195.172.139.0/24RPKI validIRR covering19
195.172.141.0/24RPKI validIRR covering52
216.23.64.0/24RPKI validIRR covering55
216.23.66.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
216.23.70.0/24RPKI validIRR covering39
216.23.71.0/24RPKI validIRR covering47

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

7 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS216245 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
80.249.134.0/24/24RIPENCC
82.40.40.0/21/24RIPENCC
143.14.104.0/22/24RIPENCC
195.172.136.0/21/24RIPENCC
212.135.208.0/21/24RIPENCC
216.23.64.0/20/24RIPENCC
2a13:edc0::/29/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

15 objects · 8 not announced

Route objects naming AS216245 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
80.249.134.0/24RIPE—CYBERVERSE-MNT2026-02-24Not announced
82.40.40.0/21RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-02-24Not announced
82.40.40.0/21RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2026-04-09Not announced
143.14.104.0/22RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-02-24Not announced
143.14.104.0/22RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2026-02-24Not announced
195.172.136.0/21RIPE—AS3257-IPAM-MNT2026-02-25Not announced
212.135.208.0/21RIPE—AS3257-IPAM-MNT2026-02-25Not announced
216.23.64.0/21RIPE—CYBERJET-MNT2026-03-02Not announced
2a13:edc0::/44RIPE—LIR-SG-CYBERJET-1-MNT2026-04-06Announced
2a13:edc0::/47RIPE—CYBERVERSE-AUTO-MNT2026-07-12Announced
2a13:edc0:1::/48RIPE—LIR-SG-CYBERJET-1-MNT2026-02-24Announced
2a13:edc0:20::/48RIPE—LIR-SG-CYBERJET-1-MNT2026-02-24Announced
2a13:edc0:50::/48RIPEThis is a testing routeLIR-SG-CYBERJET-1-MNT2026-08-13Announced
2a13:edc0:100::/40RIPE—LIR-SG-CYBERJET-1-MNT2026-09-11Announced
2a13:edc0:200::/40RIPE—LIR-SG-CYBERJET-1-MNT2026-09-11Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS216245 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS216245:AS-CYBERJETPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-18186RADBLists AS216245 as a direct member
AS-CYBERVERSEARINLists AS216245 as a direct member
AS-CYBERVERSE-AUTOARINLists AS216245 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS216245 as a direct member
AS-KORNETBGPRADBLists AS216245 as a direct member
AS154562:AS-CYBERVERSE-AUTOAPNICLists AS216245 as a direct member
AS216211:AS-CYBERVERSERIPELists AS216245 as a direct member
AS216211:AS-CYBERVERSE-AUTORIPELists AS216245 as a direct member
AS216211:AS-CYBERVERSE-SRCRIPELists AS216245 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIAASCUSTAPNICLists AS216245 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-ASIAASCUSTRADBLists AS216245 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.