asn.dev

Routing security

AS216219 MADLEHN Ken Madlehn

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 6 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 7 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS216219 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a13:f740::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a13:f740:1::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a13:f740:2::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a13:f740:4::/48RPKI validIRR29
2a13:f740:5::/48RPKI validIRR30
185.28.44.0/24RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

7 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS216219 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
185.28.44.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a13:f740::/48/48RIPENCC
2a13:f740:1::/48/48RIPENCC
2a13:f740:2::/48/48RIPENCC
2a13:f740:3::/48/48RIPENCC
2a13:f740:4::/48/48RIPENCC
2a13:f740:5::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

11 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS216219 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a13:f740:3::/48RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732026-09-26Not announced
2a13:f740:3::/48RIPE—LIR-DE-MADLEHN-1-MNT2024-04-23Not announced
185.28.44.0/24RIPE—LIR-DE-MADLEHN-1-MNT2025-02-18Announced
2a13:f740::/48RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732023-11-13Announced
2a13:f740::/48RIPE—LIR-DE-MADLEHN-1-MNT2023-10-04Announced
2a13:f740:1::/48RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732024-10-02Announced
2a13:f740:1::/48RIPE—LIR-DE-MADLEHN-1-MNT2024-01-11Announced
2a13:f740:2::/48RADBVultr Customer RouteMAINT-AS204732025-08-31Announced
2a13:f740:2::/48RIPE—LIR-DE-MADLEHN-1-MNT2024-04-23Announced
2a13:f740:4::/48RIPE—LIR-DE-MADLEHN-1-MNT2024-07-24Announced
2a13:f740:5::/48RIPE—LIR-DE-MADLEHN-1-MNT2026-10-01Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS216219 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-OVHRIPELists AS216219 as a direct member
AS20473:AS-VULTRRADBLists AS216219 as a direct member
AS211301:AS-UNESTYRIPELists AS216219 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-06 13:02 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-06. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.