asn.dev

Routing security

AS216091 -Reserved AS-

Hosting RIPE

RPKI valid 78% 7 of 9 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 2 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 3 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

9 observed

Every prefix observed with AS216091 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
44.30.56.0/24No ROAIRR57
44.32.207.0/24No ROAIRR57
2a0a:cd83::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0a:cd83:1::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0a:cd83:5::/48RPKI validIRR34
2a0a:cd83:1000::/40RPKI validIRR34
2a0a:cd83:1300::/40RPKI validIRR34
2a0b:4e07:43::/48RPKI validIRR34
2001:67c:d38::/48RPKI validIRR34

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

3 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS216091 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2001:67c:d38::/48/48RIPENCC
2a0a:cd83::/32/48RIPENCC
2a0b:4e07:43::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 3 not announced

Route objects naming AS216091 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0a:cd83:2::/48RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-09-26Not announced
2a0a:cd83:3::/48RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-09-26Not announced
2a0a:cd83:4::/48RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-09-28Not announced
44.30.56.0/24RADBLB3CJMAINT-ARDC2025-10-31Announced
44.32.207.0/24RADBLB3CJMAINT-ARDC2025-10-31Announced
2001:67c:d38::/48RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-09-03Announced
2a0a:cd83::/48RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-09-26Announced
2a0a:cd83:1::/48RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-09-26Announced
2a0a:cd83:5::/48RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-09-28Announced
2a0a:cd83:1000::/40RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-11-02Announced
2a0a:cd83:1300::/40RIPE—ETH0-MNT2025-11-02Announced
2a0b:4e07:43::/48RIPE—HOP179-MNT2025-09-26Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS216091 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-211956-DOWNSTREAMSRIPELists AS216091 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS216091 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS216091 as a direct member
AS-TERRAHOSTRIPELists AS216091 as a direct member
AS212514:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS216091 as a direct member
AS56655:AS-GIGAHOSTRIPELists AS216091 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-21 12:00 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-21. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.