asn.dev

Routing security

AS216061 RASA_SAMANEH_OFOGH

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 6 of 6 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 15 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

6 observed

Every prefix observed with AS216061 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
94.184.0.0/24RPKI validIRR54
94.184.1.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.184.2.0/24RPKI validIRR54
94.184.3.0/24RPKI validIRR54
94.184.5.0/24RPKI validIRR53
94.184.7.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

15 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS216061 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
94.184.0.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.1.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.2.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.3.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.5.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.7.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.8.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.25.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.184.27.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a03:9381:1::/48/48RIPENCC
2a03:9381:2::/48/48RIPENCC
2a03:9381:3::/48/48RIPENCC
2a03:9381:4::/48/48RIPENCC
2a12:bec0:580::/44/48RIPENCC
2a14:7c0:300::/40/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 7 not announced

Route objects naming AS216061 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
94.184.8.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Not announced
94.184.25.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Not announced
94.184.27.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Not announced
2a03:9381:1::/48RIPE—AD14849-MNT2025-08-24Not announced
2a03:9381:2::/48RIPE—AD14849-MNT2025-08-24Not announced
2a03:9381:3::/48RIPE—AD14849-MNT2025-08-21Not announced
2a03:9381:4::/48RIPE—AD14849-MNT2025-08-21Not announced
94.184.0.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Announced
94.184.1.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Announced
94.184.2.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Announced
94.184.3.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-19Announced
94.184.5.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Announced
94.184.7.0/24RIPE—IPM-MNT2026-08-05Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS216061 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-400304-DOWNSTREAMSARINLists AS216061 as a direct member
AS-COSMICARINLists AS216061 as a direct member
AS-CRUNCHBITS-SPOARINLists AS216061 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS216061 as a direct member
AS-XENTAIN:AS-CUSTOMERSARINLists AS216061 as a direct member
AS30456:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS216061 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-24 12:14 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-24. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.