Routing security
AS215437 SUMMERHOSTING Autonomous System Number - SummerHosting sp. z o. o.
Unclassified RIPE Content
Announcements
What this network originates
Every prefix observed with AS215437 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.
| Prefix | RPKI | IRR | Vantage points |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2a12:bec4:1b60::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR | 31 |
| 2a12:bec4:1b61::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR | 31 |
| 2a12:bec4:1b62::/48 | RPKI valid | IRR | 31 |
| 2a14:1ec7:1100::/40 | RPKI valid | IRR | 34 |
| 93.95.113.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR | 53 |
| 93.95.119.0/24 | RPKI valid | IRR | 54 |
RPKI · ROAs
Route origin authorisations
Signed statements by address holders that AS215437 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.
| Prefix | Max length | Trust anchor |
|---|---|---|
| 93.95.113.0/24 | /24 | RIPENCC |
| 93.95.119.0/24 | /24 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b60::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b61::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b62::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b63::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b64::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b65::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b66::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b67::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b68::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b69::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b6a::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b6b::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b6c::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b6d::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b6e::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a12:bec4:1b6f::/48 | /48 | RIPENCC |
| 2a14:1ec7:1100::/40 | /48 | RIPENCC |
ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.
RPKI · ASPA
Declared transit providers
This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.
| AS | Network | ASPA | Routing paths |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS50606 | Horyzont Technologie Internetowe sp.z.o.o. | Declared | Observed |
| AS202520 | SkyPass Solutions Sp. z o.o. | Declared | Observed |
| AS214481 | Wojciech Czapkowicz | Declared | Observed |
An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.
IRR
Registered route objects
Route objects naming AS215437 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.
| Prefix | Source | Description | Maintainer | Changed | Routing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 93.95.113.0/24 | RADB | autogen | MAINT-AS834 | 2026-06-15 | Announced |
| 93.95.113.0/24 | RIPE | — | NETUTILS-MNT | 2026-06-15 | Announced |
| 93.95.119.0/24 | RADB | autogen | MAINT-AS834 | 2024-02-23 | Announced |
| 93.95.119.0/24 | RIPE | — | NETUTILS-MNT | 2025-02-12 | Announced |
| 2a12:bec4:1b60::/48 | RIPE | — | SMRH-MNT | 2025-07-13 | Announced |
| 2a12:bec4:1b61::/48 | RIPE | — | SMRH-MNT | 2025-07-13 | Announced |
| 2a12:bec4:1b62::/48 | RIPE | — | SMRH-MNT | 2026-06-29 | Announced |
| 2a14:1ec7:1100::/40 | RIPE | — | CHUNK-MNT | 2025-05-29 | Announced |
IRR
AS-sets
The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS215437 directly show who expects to carry it.
| AS-set | Where | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
AS215437:AS-SMRH | PeeringDB | Declared by the operator as its own set |
AS-CDN77 | RIPE | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
AS-HURRICANEV6 | RADB | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6 | RIPE | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
AS202520:AS-BGP | RIPE | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
AS202520:AS-CLIENTS | RIPE | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
AS202673:AS-OHZ | RIPE | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
AS214481:AS-WCZAPKOWICZ | RIPE | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
AS215437:AS-SMRH | RIPE | Lists AS215437 as a direct member |
RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-22 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-22. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.